The dissolved Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Aden has called for a “million-man rally” next Friday, describing the demonstration as a peaceful and civilized expression of its demands, in a fresh escalation targeting the new government led by Shaye’ Al-Zindani, the Presidential Leadership Council, and Saudi Arabia, which has become Yemen’s principal backer after the United Arab Emirates was expelled from the country in January
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In its latest statement, the STC described the cabinet as a “de facto government,” referring to it simply as the “Yemeni government” — wording that, within the council’s discourse, signals rejection and suggests it represents only northern Yemen. The council said the government was not formed through genuine partnership and was pursuing policies hostile to the south, which it says seeks independence
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A statement by STC spokesperson Anwar Al-Tamimi, who is based in the United Arab Emirates, included direct insults toward Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi, referring to him in terms commonly used in Yemen for convicted criminals and mentioning him by name without title. The statement said developments in Aden had crossed red lines and threatened escalation, which later materialized in the call for street protests
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The mobilization constitutes a challenge to authorities in Aden, including local and security institutions, and also to Saudi Arabia, whose forces are present in the city to stabilize conditions and oversee the integration of military and security formations under government command
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The rally is also seen as an attempt to disrupt the government’s agenda and exert pressure that could keep it preoccupied, hindering its ability to manage the broader situation and deliver tangible improvements in public services — a key benchmark by which residents judge the government’s performance
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The STC appears to be betting on several factors. These include the presence of former STC figures within the government, the persistence of loyal networks within security and state institutions, and the exploitation of measures taken against the council — such as the closure of its offices and the removal of certain leaders — as grievances to mobilize support
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Notably, recent STC statements have avoided mentioning Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, focusing instead on rejecting the government and the Presidential Leadership Council. The call for mass mobilization appears aimed at demonstrating continued popular backing and projecting resilience despite recent setbacks
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The development is striking given that the STC, when it controlled Aden, did not permit protests. It now asserts its right to peaceful assembly in the city. The outcome will depend on how local and security authorities respond — whether they allow the demonstration or move to block it
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Recent STC messaging has become increasingly inward-focused. Rather than emphasizing service provision and governance — themes it previously highlighted — the council now concentrates on denouncing measures taken against it. This shift suggests a contraction of its political weight and a reordering of priorities toward institutional survival, framed rhetorically as a struggle for a future southern state and used to rally supporters
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The council’s tone toward external actors has also shifted. Since the UAE’s departure from Yemen, the STC has largely ceased public praise of Abu Dhabi. By contrast, Saudi Arabia now features in its rhetoric as an adversary and the principal backer of forces opposed to the council, including the Giants Brigades and the National Shield forces. The former recently shuttered STC offices. In earlier years, the council refrained from criticizing Riyadh and often commended its role, a posture that had suggested Saudi acquiescence to STC actions and escalation
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Yet the council’s influence appears to have waned across most southern governorates, with Aden standing as the main exception. Public activity and on-the-ground presence have diminished elsewhere. Aden’s significance is self-evident: it is the capital, the seat of government, and the center of political and administrative power in the south
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In other southern cities, the government — backed by Saudi Arabia — has reasserted local, security, and military control through a series of leadership changes and by elevating the National Shield forces as a dominant actor. The STC’s popular base has also weakened in governorates such as Hadramawt, Shabwa, and Al-Mahra
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In Aden, however, military formations affiliated with the STC remain largely intact. Changes have been largely cosmetic, involving integration measures, rebranding, and the appointment of commanders who maintain close ties with the council and have worked alongside it in recent years. Some figures widely seen as aligned with the STC have been placed in key posts, including Jalal Al-Rubaie
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A parallel dynamic is evident in civilian administration. Key positions have been assigned to officials previously associated with the STC and who continue to operate in a political grey zone. Aden Governor Abdulrahman Sheikh has recently issued decisions viewed as favorable to the council, including changes to the city’s official designation and the removal of the Yemeni republic’s emblem, which has not appeared alongside the national flag in official settings
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A similar pattern extends to some ministers appointed to the new cabinet who previously maintained strong links to the STC. Their conduct since assuming office has not signaled a clear shift in position
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Observers also point to a deeply rooted network built by the STC over recent years, comprising officials and employees in sensitive state sectors such as revenue collection, policing, real estate administration, and logistics linked to trade and economic activity. Many within this network hold influential positions and view the new political reality as a threat to their interests, seeing the council’s decline as a loss of status and its resurgence as a guarantee of continuity. As such, they may present obstacles to government initiatives, particularly given their alleged connections to past service crises and, in some cases, to systems of administrative and financial corruption associated with the council
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Taken together, these dynamics suggest Aden may face further complexity and tension driven by the dissolved STC in confrontation with the government and the Presidential Leadership Council. The situation may require a recalibration of official approaches to the council beyond its formal dissolution, rather than treating the departure of specific leaders as sufficient while leaving its structures in Aden capable of shaping events
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